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NOTES
State and Local Limitations on Ballot Measure Contributions
Despite the Supreme Court's observation that referendums
demonstrate "devotion to democracy," 1 some state and local governments have tempered their citizens' direct democratic participation
by limiting contributions to ballot measure committees? At least
one court3 has held that these limitations violate the first amendment,4 but in Citizens Against Rent Control v. City ef .Berkeley5
I. James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 141 (1971) (upholding amendment to California's constitution requiring referendum approval of publicly financed low-income housing).
2. See, e.g., FLA. STAT.§ 106.08(l)(d) (1979); Berkeley, Cal., Election Reform Act of 1974,
§ 602 (Ord. No. 4700-N.S.) (June 4, 1974).
A "ballot measure" is an electoral question submitted to the people for approval or rejection by popular vote through the referendum or initiative process. A referendum involves a
constitutional amendment or statute that the legislature has referred to the people for approval
or rejection. An initiative, on the other hand, is proposed by the citizens themselves and submitted for popular approval. See REFERENDUMS, A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF PRACTICE AND
THEORY (D. Butler & A. Raney eds. 1978) [hereinafter cited as REFERENDUMS].
A "ballot measure committee" is a committee, group, or association, formed to urge the
electorate to vote for or against a particular ballot measure. A "ballot measure limitation" is a
dollar limitation on the amount that individuals or groups can contribute to ballot measure
committees.
3. Let's Help Florida v. McCrary, 621 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1980), appealfiled, 49 U.S.L.W.
3625 (U.S. Dec. 12, 1980) (No. 80-970) (striking down a $3,000 limitation imposed on contributions for statewide ballot measures under FLA. STAT.§ 106.08(l)(d) (1979)).
Several courts have held statutes prohibiting corporate spending in connection with ballot
measures unconstitutional. See C. & C. Plywood Corp. v. Hanson, 583 F.2d 421 (9th Cir.
1978) (holding unconstitutional under the first amendment a state statute prohibiting corporate
spending for political communication bearing on ballot measure questions); Schwartz v.
Romnes, 495 F.2d 844 (2d Cir. 1974) (holding that :r,ew York statute prohibiting corporate
payments "for any political purpose whatsoever'' must be construed narrowly so as not to
prohibit corporate contributions to ballot measure committees).
4. U.S. CONST. amend. I states: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for
a redress of grievances."
5. 27 Cal. 3d 819,614 P.2d 742, 167 Cal. Rptr. 84 (1980),prob.juris. noted, IOI S. Ct. 1344
(1981) (No. 80-737). The appellant in CARC was an unincorporated association formed to
oppose a proposed amendment to the Berkeley City Charter that would have established a
citywide rent control board. The committee accepted contributions totalling $108,000. Some
$18,600 of this was received in violation of the $250 limit. See Brief for Appellants at 5 n.4,
CARC, 27 Cal. 3d 819, 614 P.2d 742, 167 Cal. Rptr. 84 (1980) (on file with the Michigan Law
Review) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Apps.]. Berkeley, Cal., Election Reform Act of 1974,
§ 602 (Ord. No. 4700-N.S.) (June 4, 1974) limited contributions to $250, and § 604 provided
that organizations must surrender contributions in excess of the limitation to the Berkeley City
Treasury.
Section 602 of the ordinance was declared invalid on its face and summary judgment for
the plaintiff citizens' committee was granted at the trial court level. Summary judgment was
upheld on appeal, 99 Cal. App. 3d 736, 160 Cal. Rptr. 448 (Ct. App. 1979). The California
Supreme Court reversed without remanding for further findings of fact. See CARC, 27 Cal. 3d
at 835, 614 P.2d at 751-52, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 93-94 (Richardson, J., dissenting):
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(CARC), the California Supreme Court approved a $250 ceiling on
municipal ballot measure committee contributions. The court relied
on Buckley v. Valeo, 6 which upheld the Federal Election Campaign
Act's7 (FECA) limitations on contributions to candidates and candidate authorized campaign committees, but invalidated its direct
spending limitations. The California court concluded that ballot
measure limitations are constitutionally permissible because ballot
measure contributions resembled the candidate contributions that
Buckley held could be restricted.
This Note's thesis is that ballot measure limitations unconstitutionally infringe upon the rights of free speech and association. Part
I analyzes Buckley and concludes that the CARC court misapplied
its distinction between contributions and direct expenditures. Part II
tests ballot measure limitations against Buckley's "exacting scrutiny"
standard. 8 It identifies the state interests asserted in defense of ballot
measure limitations - lessening abuse by narrow interest groups,
reducing apathy, and equalizing political expression - and concludes that ballot measure limitations do not permissibly further
these governmental interests. 9
There is no record before us and in this connection the procedural posture of the case
should be noted. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the citizens' committee which attacked the ordinance. Assuming, only for purposes of analysis, that the
trial court was improvident in the entry of its summary judgment invalidating the ordinance, it is manifestly unfair for the majority . . . to sustain the ordinance without affording the citizens' committee an opportunity to challenge or rebut the [evidence] ... on
which the majority wholly relies.
6. 424 U.S. I (1976) (per curiam).
7. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263
(codified in scattered sections of 2, 5, 18, 26, 47 U.S.C.) (amending Federal Election Campaign
Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) (codified in scattered sections of 2, 18, 47
U.S.C.), as amended by Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94283, 90 Stat. 475 (codified in scattered sections of 2, 18, 26 U.S.C.).
8. See text at notes 18-19 infra.
9. A sufficiently important state interest will justify abridgment of first amendment rights
because "neither the right to associate nor the right to participate in political activities is absolute." United States Civil Serv. Commn. v. National Assn. of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548,
567 (1973) (upholding the Hatch Act's prohibition against federal employees actively participating in political management or political campaigning). .But see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.
at 1, 27 n.2 (emphasizing "that [the Hatch Act provision reviewed in Letter Carriers] did not
restrict an employee's right to express his views on political issues and candidates").
Additionally, the regulation in question must in fact further the interest asserted in justification of the regulation. See, e.g., Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516,525 (1960) ("[N]o
relevant correlation between the power of the municipalities to impose [license taxes] and the
compulsory disclosure and publication of' membership lists); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (holding that forced disclosure of civil rights group's membership
list had no "substantial bearing" on the asserted state interest of monitoring compliance with
foreign corporation registration statute).
The regulation also must avoid unnecessary abridgment of first amendment rights. The
Court generally refers to this requirement as the "less drastic means test." See, e.g., United
States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967) (holding statute barring all Communist party members
from working in defense factories invalid; restriction of first amendment freedoms of association more extensive than necessary to accomplish purpose of statute); Shelton v. Tucker, 364
U.S. 479 (1960) (invalidating state statute requiring teachers to disclose every organization of
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I. THE FIRST AMENDMENT INTERESTS
Buckley v. Valeo: A Constitutional Framework

A.
The Supreme Court's 1976 decision in .Buckley v. Valeo 10 provides a starting point for constitutional analysis of ballot measure
limitations. In .Buckley, the Court tested the constitutionality of the
1974 Amendments to the FECA. 11 Reacting to Watergate, 12 Congress had amended the Act to police the financing of the political
process. 13 The amended Act imposed limitations on contributions to
candidates and candidate authorized campaign committees, 14 and on
direct expenditures by individuals and groups "relative to a clearly
identified candidate." 15 In a long per curiam opinion the Court upheld the contribution limitations, 16 but struck down the restrictions
which they were members over five-year period on the ground that the "interference with
[freedom of association] goes far beyond what might be justified in the exercise of the State's
legitimate inquiry").
Ordinarily, the Court simply invalidates the legislation, but in some cases it has specified a
"less drastic means." See, e.g., Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943). See generally
L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 722-24 (1978); Note, Less .Drastic Means and the
First Amendment, 78 YALE L.J. 464, 471 (1969). Under the "less drastic means" approach, the
government bears the burden of showing that legislation infringing upon first amendment
rights is no broader than necessary to accomplish a legitimate end. See, e.g., Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 66 (1960) (concurring opinion); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939)
(rejecting the contention that a statute broadly infringing first amendment rights should be
upheld because it accomplishes a legitimate state interest "more efficiently?' than a narrower
statute).
10. 424 U.S. I (1976) (per curiam).
11. See note 7 supra.
12. For a brief summary of the history of the Watergate investigation, see 2 CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, INC., DOLLAR PoLmcs 12 (1974).
13. The 1971 amendments were an attempt to correct the deficiencies of existing legislation
in curbing campaign financing abuse. The commentators generally agree that the existing
legislation was wholly ineffective. See, e.g., D. ADAMANY & G. AGREE, POLITICAL MONEY
43-61 (1975).
For a detailed analysis of the provisions at issue in Buckley, see Comment, Buckley. v.
Valeo: The Supreme Court and Federal Campaign Reform, 76 CoLUM. L. REV. 852 (1976).
Congress was apparently aware of the unprecedented scope of the amendments and provided
for expedited review. 2 U.S.C. § 437h(a), (b) (1976 & Supp. III, 1979) (providing that constitutional questions under the Act could be certified to court of appeals sitting en bane with direct
appeal to the Supreme Court).
14. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendment of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, § IOl(A),
(B), 88 Stat. 1263 (repealed 1976). 18 U.S.C. § 608(b)(4)(a) stated that "contributions to a
named candidate made to any political committee authorized by such candidate, in writing, to
accept contributions on his behalf shall be considered to be contributions made to such candidate . . . ."
15. Section 608(e)(l) limited such expenditures to $1,000. 18 U.S.C. § 608(e)(I) (Supp. IV
1974) (repealed 1976). These limitations were applicable to natural persons, partnerships,
committees, associations, corporations, "or any other organization or group of persons." 18
U.S.C. § 59l(g) (Supp. IV 1974) (repealed 1980). In order to avoid impermissible vagueness,
the Court construed the "relative to a clearly identified candidate" qualification to include
only "communications that include explicit words of advocacy of election or defeat of a candidate." 424 U.S. at 43. So narrowed, the Court found the limitation incapable of accomplishing the asserted purpose of closing any "loopholes" left open by the contribution limitations.
16. Contributions to both candidates and candidate authorized campaign committees will
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on direct spending.1 7
The Buckley Court initially posited that the first amendment subjects limitations on expression and association to "exacting scrutiny."18 It then held that the Act's limitations on spending for
political communication regulate speech and not conduct. 19 Candidate contribution and direct expenditure limitations, however, do
not restrict speech to the same extent. Direct expenditure ceilings
be referred to hereinafter as "candidate contributions." Limitations on candidate contributions will be referred to as "candidate limitations."
17. 424 U.S. at 58-60.
18. 424 U.S. at 16. The Court has often cited Buckley for the proposition that regulations
infringing first amendment rights are subject to "exacting scrutiny." See, e.g., First Natl. Bank
v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786 n.23 (1978); Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 362 (1976) (plurality
opinion) {holding patronage dismissal practice violative of first amendment rights of political
belief and association). "It is firmly established that a significant impairment of First Amendment rights must survive exacting scrutiny." (citation omitted).
It can be argued, however, that the Court did not scrutinize the candidate limitations as
carefully as it claimed. For example, the Court did not inquire whether the elimination of
direct corruption could have been achieved with less first amendment infringement by establishing higher contribution limitations. The Court stated that "Congress's failure to engage in
such fine tuning does not invalidate the legislation." 424 U.S. at 30. Similarly, the Court
upheld the overall contribution limitation on the ground that this provision was necessary to
prevent evasion of the basic contribution limitation. 424 U.S. at 38.
The court exhibited similar deference to congressional determination of the necessary
scope of legislation effectuating a legitimate governmental interest when it upheld limitations
on the partisan political activity of federal employees in Civil Serv. Commn. v. National Assn.
of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973). In both Buckley and Lei/er Carriers, the statutes addressed the day-to-day administration of the federal system and the conduct of national level
candidate elections - processes with which Congress is presumably most familiar. Deference
to congressional judgment in these areas is particularly appropriate. The Berkeley City Council, however, probably did not possess similar expertise with regard to the broad and largely
unanswered questions of political alienation and voter apathy. The CARC court's deference to
the city council's assessment of the relationship between large contributions to ballot measure
committees and voter apathy therefore seems inappropriate. See CARC, 27 Cal. 3d at 831,614
P.2d at 749, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 91.
19. The court below held that both contribution and direct expenditure limitation~ were
regulatable as conduct under United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). Buckley v. Valeo,
519 F.2d 821, 840 (D.C. Cir. 1975). In O'Brien, the Court rejected a draft card burner's claim
that his activity was protected under the first amendment. Under the O'Brien test, legislation
or government action affecting s_peech is valid if: (1) the regulation is within the constitutional
power of the government; (2) the regulation furthers an important government interest; (3) the
government interest is unrelated to the suppression of expression; and (4) the incidental restriction of first amendment rights is no greater than necessary. 391 U.S. at 377. The Buckley
Court rejected the contention that spending money for political communication was regulatable as conduct:
The expenditure of money simply cannot be equated with such conduct as destruction of a
draft card. Some forms of communication made possible by the giving and spending of
money involve speech alone, some involve conduct primarily, and some involve a combination of the two. Yet this Court has never suggested that the dependence of a communication on the expenditure of money operates itself to introduce a nonspeech element or to
reduce the exacting scrutiny required by the First Amendment.
424 U.S. at 16.
The Court also stated that even if spending were treated as "conduct," the limitations
would fail under the O'Brien test because "the governmental interests advanced in support of
the Act involve 'suppressing communication.'" 424 U.S. at 17. See generally Henkin, Tire
Supreme Court, 1967 Term - Foreword· On .Drawing Lines, 82 HARV. L. REV. 63, 79 (1968)
(criticizing the "speech-conduct" distinction).
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reduce "the quantity of expression by restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration and the size of the audience reached." 20 The Court thus concluded that these limitations
intolerably restrained political speech.21
Candidate limitations, in contrast, only marginally restrict a contributor's ability freely to communicate.22 Four arguments favored
this conclusion. First, the link between the size of candidate contributions and the quantity of a contributor's communication is tenuous, "since the expression rests solely on the undifferentiated,
symbolic act of contributing."23 Second, individuals and groups
often contribute to candidates for reasons unrelated to their political
viewpoints. A contributor might donate because of loyalty to the
candidate or the candidate's party,24 or in the hope of "purchasing"
impermissible influence should the candidate be elected.25 The dol20. 424 U.S. at 19. The Court found that expenditure limitations prevent citizens and
groups other than candidates, political parties, and the press from using the "most effective
modes of co=unication." 424 U.S. at 19-20.
The practical reality of the modem political process is that it costs a good deal of money to
battle effectively in the political arena. See generally D. ADAMANY & G. AGREE, supra note
13, at 19-27. The Court recognized that any limitation on spending for political co=unication significantly curtailed expression:
Mirtually every means of co=unicating ideas in today's mass society requires the expenditure of money. The distribution of the humblest handbill or leaflet entails printing,
paper, and circulation costs. . . . The electorate's increasing dependence on te1evision,
radio, and other mass media for news and information has made these expensive modes
of communication indispensable instruments of effective political speech.
424 U.S. at 19. See note 54 infra.
21. 424 U.S. at 39, 58-59.
22. 424 U.S. at 20-21.
23. 424 U.S. at 21. In the Court's words, candidate contributions provide "a general expression of support for the candidate and his views," but do not "co=unicate the underlying
basis for the support." 424 U.S. at 21.
24. Often loyalty to a candidate does not involve a corrupt motive; instead it amounts to
reflexive support. See D. TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS 309 (2d ed. 1951) (quoting
V. KEY, SOUTHERN POLITICS IN STATE AND NATION 470-71 (1949)):
Most speculation [as to corrupt motivation in making a candidate contribution] has been
by i>rofessors and newspaper reporters, persons to whom $25 is a wad of money, and it is
doubtful that they achieve a sophisticateo comprehension of the motivation, attitudes, and
expectations of persons who can blithely throw $5,000 in the pot to help elect old Joe, a
college classmate, a drinking companion, and a fellow Rotarian, without being any the
poorer.
Individuals that identify strongly with one of the two major political parties are far more
likely to make contributions to candidates than individuals who do not profess loyalty to a
particular party. See Adamany, The Sources efMoney: An Overview, 425 ANNALS 17, 19-20
(1976).
25. The problem lies in distinguishing between a contribution that merely amounts to
"support" and a contribution that is the "quid" in the Buckley Court's quid pro quo. The
difficulty is probably best recognized by Congresspersons themselves: "The distinction between a campaign contribution and a bribe is almost a hairline's difference. You can hardly
tell one from the other." 120 CONG. REc. 10,351 (1974) (remarks of Senator Inouye, quoting
Senator Long).
Ordinarily, of course, the contributor's motivation would be irrelevant to the first amendment interests involved in making the contribution. But where the magnitude of the contribution suggests that an individual contributor could have secured effective political
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lar amounts of contributions made for these reasons are only weakly
linked to actual political expression. Third, contributions may not
result in any political expression unless spent by a candidate or association to present views to the voters. 26
Finally, if a contribution does produce speech, the "transformation . . . into political debate involves speech by someone other than
the contributor."27 A candidate contribution is an open-ended
grant. 28 Because candidates must appeal to broad segments of the
electorate, they cannot serve as surrogate speakers for contributors. 29
And contributors, expressing "general support" for the candidate
and his positions, 30 neither demand nor expect communication of
their viewpoints.31 Even speech made possible by a contribution,
therefore, is likely to reflect the candidate's, and not the contributor's, viewpoint.32 For these reasons, the Buckley Court concluded
that "contribution ceilings . . . serve the basic governmeµtal interest
in safeguarding the integrity of the electoral process without directly
impinging upon the rights of individual cit12ens and candidates to
engage in political debate and discussion." 33
Buckley's distinction between direct expenditures and candidate
contributions is based not on mere form, but on the substantive imco=unication through direct expenditures, the prospect of corruption between contributor
and candidate may justify contribution limitations.
26. 424 U.S. at 21.
27. 424 U.S. at 21.
28. A contribution made directly to the candidate by the contributor is clearly in the nature
of a grant. If a contribution is not an open-ended grant, but is instead conditioned upon later
favorable treatment, the candidate's conduct in accepting the contribution would be tantamount to corruption. Similarly, contributions made to "candidate authorized committees," see
note 14 supra, are controlled by the candidate, or by individuals who are ultimately accountable to the candidate - generally professional media managers. See generally Nimmo, Po/ilica/
Image Makers and the Mass Media, 427 ANNALS 33 (1976). See also A. HEARD, THE COSTS
OF DEMOCRACY 408-22 (1960), for a discussion of the structure and function of candidate
campaign organizations and the processes involved in "transforming" contributions into political co=unication.
29. For an anecdotal account of how a candidate attempts to increase general support
among voters without at the same time making any commitment to specific segments of the
electorate, see Lorenz, An Insider's View ofJerry Brown, EsQUIRE, Feb. 1978, al 66.
30. 424 U.S. at 21.
31. One example of a "contribution" that did not result in expression of the contributor's
viewpoint was the American Telephone and Telegraph Company's $1.5 million contribution
to the Democratic National Co=ittee forgiving a debt of that amount incurred for services
rendered in the 1968 election. See Miller v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 507 F.2d 759 (3d Cir.
1974). Contributions may also be used to finance illegal activities, see, e.g., CONGRESSIONAL
QUARTERLY, INC., supra note 12, at 9-15, or to enrich the candidate, see, e.g., CONGRESSIONAL
QUARTERLY, INC., CONGRESSIONAL ETHICS 39-41 (1977).
32. It is possible, of course, that an individual contributor's political opinion might be so
close to the candidate's that the contributor would have a fundamental free speech interest in
making unlimited contributions. As a practical matter, however, few contributors, if any, will
have political positions that precisely match those of the candidate across the entire range of
issues that the candidate will address during the campaign.
33.. 424 U.S. at 58.
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pact of these restrictions on speech. Candidate limitations are permissible because they only minimally curtail the contributor's
speech; direct expenditure ceilings are invalid because they substantially restrain individual political expression. The .Buckley distinction thus affirms the first amendment interest in individual speech.34
But the distinction is also consistent with the Court's view that the
first amendment should promote ''uninhibited, robust and wide open
debate" on public issues.35 Although .Buckley upheld the Act's contribution limitations, the Court implied that even these limitations
34. See generally T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6 (1970): "First,
freedom of expression is essential as a means of assuring individual self-fulfillment. The
proper end of man is the realization of his character and potentialities as a human being." The
Supreme Court has recognized that the first amendment's protection can be premised in some
cases solely on the interest of the speaker in self-expression. See First Natl. Bank v. Bellotti,
435 U.S. 765, 777 n.12 (1978). The Court has held that first amendment protection of individual expression extends to unorthodox or "symbolic" speech. See, e.g., Cohen v. California,
403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971) (expression that communicates message in a manner that some individuals might find offensive protected under the first amendment); Street v. New York, 394 U.S.
576 (1969) (reversing conviction of individual who burned flag on street comer while distraught over the death of civil rights leader). But cf. New Rider v. Board of Educ., 480 F.2d
693 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1097 (1973) (upholding the indefinite suspension of native American Indian students for failure to conform with school hair-length regulations; no
substantial constitutional question presented). See generally Nimmer, Tire Meaning of Symbolic Speech Under the First Amendment, 21 UCLA L. REV. 29, 61 (1973).
Other first amendment scholars have argued that the first amendment's protection flows
from "the necessities of the program of self-government." See A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL
FREEDOM 26-28 (1948) (purpose of first amendment is to protect the freedom of ideas so that
individuals may capably govern themselves). See also Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First
Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. l, 25 (1971) (first amendment protection should be limited
to speech that is "politiC!il").
35. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). See generally Kalven, The
New York Times Case: A Note on "Tire Central Meaning of the First Amendment", 1964 SUP.
CT. REV. 191.
Under this doctrine, the speaker need not "possess" first amendment rights to be protected,
because the Court also seeks to prevent governmental interference with the "marketplace of
ideas." For example, the Court has protected corporate speech on commercial and political
matters. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Commn., 447 U.S. 557, 562
n.5 (1980) (utilities enjoy the "full panoply" of first amendment rights for comment on issues
of public importance); First Natl. Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777-78 (1978) (striking down
complete prohibition of corporate spending for political communication; whether corporations
possess first amendment rights coextensive with those of natural persons not relevant).
The marketplace metaphor is surely the most durable of first amendment boilerplate probably because it has centuries of respectable philosophical support. See Cox, Tire Supreme
Court, 1979 Term -Foreword· Freedom ofExpression in the Burger Court, 94 HARV. L. REV.
1, 2 (1980). Although it is far from clear that the framers were convinced of the value of such
an approach, see, e.g., L. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION (1960) (suggesting that framers
would have prohibited much speech that is protected today); J. MADISON, The Federalist No.
JO, in THE FEDERALIST 53 (1941) (1st ed. New York 1788) (danger of factions to orderly
course of representative government), philosophers of the framer's era believed that unfettered
critical discourse led to truth. See Mill, On Liberty, in THE GREAT LEGAL PHILOSOPHERS 380,
385 (C. Morris ed. 1959).
The Supreme Court has echoed this belief:
The constitutional right of free expression is powerful medicine in a society as diverse and
populous as ours. It is designed and intended to remove governmental restraints from the
arena of public discussion, putting the decision as to wliat views shall be voiced largely
into the hands of each of us, in the hope that use of such freedom will ultimately produce
a more capable citizenry and more perfect polity and in the belief that no other approach
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could not be set so low as to impede "robust and effective" political
discussion. 36
The Buckley Court also considered whether contribution and direct expenditure limitations infringed upon the right of political association.37 As it did when discussing freedom of expression, the
Court distinguished between the two types of limitations. Direct expenditure ceilings prevent most associations "from effectively amplifying the voice of their adherents."38 Thus, constraints on the ability
of groups and organizations to make unlimited expenditures interfere with members' first amendment associational rights. 39 Candidate limitations, on the other hand, less severely restrict protected
freedom of association. First, such limitations do not prevent associations from aggregating large sums of money to promote effective advocacy. Second, candidate limitations affect only "one
important means of associating with a candidate or committee." A
would comport with the premise of individual dignity and choice upon which our political
system rests.
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971). Justice Holmes believed that a free marketplace
of ideas was not only desirable, but also constitutionally ordained:
[T]he ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas - that the best test of
truth is the power of thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, that at
any rate is the theory of our Constitution.
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
36. 424 U.S. at 21.
37. 424 U.S. 22-26. Although the Constitution does not expressly guarantee a right of
association, see Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965), the right has long been
recognized, see generally Emerson, Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression, 14
YALE LJ. 1 (1964), and has been vigorously protected.
Legislation that "may have the effect of curtailing the freedom to associate is subject to the
closest scrutiny." Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 25 (quoting NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958)).
The Court has stated time and time again that restriction of the right to associate with
others is subject to the same rigorous scrutiny as restrictions on other first amendment rights.
See, e.g., Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209,233 (1977); Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S.
347, 356, 362 (1976) (plurality orinion) (holding that the practice of dismissing government
employees on basis of party affiliaiion must be limited to employees in "policymaking positions"); United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 263-65 (1967) (right of association "ranks among
our most precious freedoms," and state must show a compelling interest to justify infringement). Although the Court originally protected the right of association in cases involving state
legislation that appeared to be motivated by a desire to harass unpopular groups, recent decisions make it clear that the application of strict scrutiny is appropriate regardless of legislative
motivation or the severity of the infringement. See Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976); Healy
v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 183 (1972).
Two policies underlie the Court's protection of the freedom to associate. First, this freedom makes the exercise of first amendment rights more effective. See generally VOLUNTARY
AssocIATIONS (NoMos XI J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1969). The Buckley Court noted
that "[e]ffective advocacy of both public and private points of view, particularly controversial
ones, is undeniably enhanced by group association." 424 U.S. at 15 (quoting NAACP v.
Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958)). Second, freedom of association is protected to ensure that individuals do not suffer any loss of first amendment rights because they
exercise their rights with others. See T. EMERSON, supra note 34, at 22; Raggi, An Independent
Righi lo Freedom ofAssociation, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 15 (1977).
38. 424 U.S. at 22.
39. 424 U.S. at 22 (quoting Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957)).
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contributor remains "free to become a member of any political association and to assist personally in the association's efforts on behalf
of candidates."40
This Note tests the validity of state and local restrictions on contributions to ballot measure committees. Buckley's distinction between contribution and expenditure limitations in federal candidate
elections provides the basic analytic framework. If form rather than
substance controls the decision, courts should uphold ballot measure
limitations. But Buckley requires analysis of the substantive impact
of spending limitations on speech and association. Section B argues
that ballot measure limitations impinge upon first amendment rights
as substantially as the direct expenditure ceilings that Buckley invalidated.
B.

Contributions to Ballot Measure Committees

Ballot measure limitations substantially restrain first amendment
rights. Ballot measure contributions are much like direct expenditures, but have little in common with candidate contributions. This
section develops that theme in four important respects.
First, citizens form ballot measure committees solely to urge the
passage or defeat of a referendum proposal.41 In candidate elections,
few contributors share the candidate's views on all political issues.
But ballot measures generally present a narrower range of issues
than do candidate elections.42 Contributors to ballot measure com40. 424 U.S. at 22.
41. The available research clearly indicates that citizen based or "grass roots" ballot measure co=ittees are ad hoc affairs, organized for the limited purpose of addressing specific
ballot measure propositions. See s. LYDENBERG, BANKROLLING BALLOTS 52-53, 61-62 (1979);
REFERENDUMS, supra note 2, at Role of Initiatives in California's Environmental Politics, 28
W. PoL. Q. 352, 359, 360-70 (1975). A recent empirical study of several ballot measure elections nationwide suggests that controversial issues involving the economic interests of an entire
industry (e.g., anti-smoking measures, "bottle-bills," nuclear power plant construction or siting
measures) are likely to spark the formation of ballot measure committees that coordinate the
expenditure of contributions from large corporations throughout the country. These coalitions
of convenience presumably dissolve after the ballot measure election. See S. LYDENBERG,
supra. For the view that corporate contributions to ballot measure co=ittees affect the outcome of ballot measure elections, see IRS Administration of Tax Laws Relating to Lobbying
(Part I): Hearings Before the Subcomm. ofthe Comm. on Government Operations, 95th Cong.,
2d Sess. 256-73 (1978) (statement of John Schockley). For the view that corporate contributions can be limited, but not prohibited, see Co=ent, The Constitutionality of Limitations on
Corporate Contributions If! Ballot Measure Campaigns, 13 U.S.F. L. REv. 145 (1978).
42. See, e.g., S. LYDENBERG, supra note 41, at 60-63 (describing the passage of a "denturism" measure; "denturism" is the practice of allowing dental technicians, rather than only
licensed, professional dentists, to perform measurement and fitting of dental plates). Of
course, not all ballot measure questions are single issue-a__ffairs as narrow in scope as the "denturism" question. See REFERENDUMS,supra note 2, at 94-95 for a content breakdown of ballot
measure questions in California. In deciding whether to build a nuclear power plant, for example, the voter may have to balance possible environmental gains against possible economic
losses. See S. LYDENBERG, supra note 41, at 35. Similarly, ballot measure questions relating
to fair-housing laws and low-income housing projects raise many issues - the desirability of
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mittees stand squarely behind the committee's message - "yes" or
"no" on a specific proposal. Because ballot measure contests are issue specific, an individual contributes with one or few issues in
mind,43 and can choose the committee that best expresses his position. If existing committees advocate opposing positions or promote
popular positions with unpersuasive arguments, individuals are free
to form their own ballot measure committees.44
Second, ballot measure contributors generally seek only to advance their political views. Neither party or candidate loyalty nor
the hope of gaining impermissible influence with elected officials affects an individual's decision to support a ballot measure committee.
Ballot measure contributors' political expression is as pure in this
respect as the "core"45 political speech of direct spenders. The likeliintegration, the possible instability of property values, and the effect that such projects might
have on local fiscal capacity.
43. Although ballot measure elections are not always single issue affairs, see note 42 supra,
they usually generate fewer and more sharply delineated issues than candidate elections. In
fact, political observers have criticized this very aspect of ballot measure elections. See Beverage Container Reuse and Recycling Act of 1977: Hearings on S. 276 before the Subcomm. for
Consumers of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transportation, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 124 (1978) (statement of Dana Duxbury) (arguing that intensive lobbying of industry on
"bottle bill" referendum in Massachussetts resulted in the measure's defeat; advertising onesided and erroneous). Ironically, the apparent trend toward one-sided, simplistic political
communication may result from the fact that "single issue" political controversies often arise
out of disputes concerning more fundamental value choices - an example of this would be the
death penalty question. But the tendency to focus ballot measure communication on one, or at
most a few, issues seems just as pronounced where the question posed to the voters is "technical":
Increased complexity of measures leads quite naturally to simplification by sponsors and
opponents seeking to persuade an amorphous public. The result . . . is the need for massive financial resources fol- public relations firms and television, billboard and newspaper
advertising that usually tely more on simplistic propaganda than on reasoned discourse.
Baker, American Conceptions of .Direct vis-a-vis Representative Governance, CLAREMONT J.
PUB. AFF. 5, 13 (1977) (quoted in REFERENDUMS, supra note 2, at 104).
The same tendency is, of course, present to some extent in candidate elections. See
Nimmo, supra note 28, at 42. But in candidate elections the voter will generally confront a
wider range of issues than in ballot measure elections. In addition to the candidate's general
political outlook and positions on specific controversies, the voter will also consider the candidate's personality, integrity, and past performance, whether in or out of office. Id. at 37. Furthermore, the campaign itself is often a fertile source of issues as candidates vie with each
other to improve their image among voters. See, e.g., D. BooRSTIN, THE IMAGE 7-44 (1961)
(candidates create "pseudo-events" or fictitious issues to differentiate themselves from other
candidates).
44. See S. LYDENBERG, supra note 41, at 57-58 (Oregon ballot measure committee formed
at grassroots level to oppose efforts of corporate opponents; raised $3,000 for communication
aimed at passing ballot measure; measure passed in face of spending by corporate opponents
of close to $300,000); Lutrin & Settle, supra note 41, at 370 (coalition of citizen groups conduct
statewide campaign for California Coastal Conservation ballot measure, making use of services donated by well-known cartoonist and professional photographers; suit filed with Federal Communications Commission under fairness doctrine resulting in free equal media time.
45. See, e.g., Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 32 (1968). ("Competition in ideas and governmental policies is at the core of our electoral process and of the First Amendment freedoms."); Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563,573 (1968) ("The public interest in having
free and unhindered debate on matters of public importance [is] the core value of the Free
Speech Clause of the First Amendment . . . .").
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hood that ballot measure contributions represent the contributor's
speech, rather than a general expression of loyalty or an attempt to
gain influence, distinguish them from candidate contributions.
Third, the Buckley Court's observation that the "transformation
of [candidate] contributions into political debate involves speech by
someone other than the contributor"46 applies with less force to ballot measure contributions. No candidate controls the "transformation" of such contributions into speech. A ballot measure committee
is merely a conduit that aggregates and channels contributions into
political communication.47 It is true, however, that a ballot measure
committee's message can never perfectly mirror the views of all contributors. The force of this "congruence argument"48 depends upon
the extent to which incongruent speech is constitutionally protected.
A transformation that may constitutionally justify limitations takes
place between contribution and communication even in ballot measure contests.49
46. 424 U.S. at 21.
47. This aggregation and channeling function allows the average individual, through contributions to ballot measure committees, to communicate with the same efficacy as individuals
with greater resources who communicate through direct spending. See Baker, Scope of the
First Amendment Freedom of Speech, in CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN AMERICA 81 (R.
Collins ed. 1980). ("In essence an association is merely an assembly displaced over time and
space. . . . [T]he group [can do] things beyond merely reasoning together. People come together in assemblies or associations in order to pursue or fulfill their goals.").
48. "Congruence" is defined as "the quality or state of agreeing or coinciding." WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 236 (1978). The Buckley Court reasoned that the interposition of the candidate between the contributor and the communication produced by the
contribution amounted to such a "transformation" that the specific dollar amount of the contribution was not central to the first amendment interests involved in making a contribution.
See text at notes 22-33 supra. This Note analyzes the extent to which there is agreement or
coincidence between the contributor's outlook on a ballot measure question and the message
conveyed by the ballot measure committee and concludes that there is at least as much congruence in making a contribution to a ballot measure committee as there is in making a direct
expenditure in the candidate election context.
This conclusion is based on the plausible assumption that contributors will not contribute
to ballot measure committees unless the committee's message is consistent with their viewpoint
on ballot measure issues. Congruence is, of course, a question of degree - the size of a contribution to a ballot measure committee, for example, reveals neither the intensity of the contributor's viewpoint nor the basis of the individual contributor's position. This Note argues,
however, that the fact that neither the act of contributing nor the size of the contribution
conveys such information does not render the spending any less protected under the first
amendment than other forms of protected political expression. The ultimate message of any
ballot measure committee - ''vote yes" or ''vote no" on a specific ballot measure - is so
closely tied to the contributor's viewpoint that ballot measure contributions should enjoy full
first amendment protection.
49. One could argue that as much transformation takes place in the ballot measure context
as in the candidate context. Just as all ballot measure contributors stand together with their
committees for or against a ballot measure, candidate contributors arguably intend to convey
the same "ultimate message" as candidates: "candidate X should be elected to office rather
than candidate Y." But this does not weaken the case for protecting ballot measure contributions, rather, it calls into question the Buckley Court's analysis of candidate limitations. See
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 244 (Burger, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(arguing that distinction between contributions and expenditures is a ''word game").
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Aggregating funds to communicate through a ballot measure
committee interposes a step that would not be present if an individual directly spent the same amount of money on political communication. Practically, however, the transformation between ballot
measure contributions and communication is similar to the transformation between direct expenditures and speech. so Direct spenders
demand the most effective communication for their dollar. 51 They
thus retain political consultants, media experts, and large staffs to
"package" and "deliver" their messsages as persuasively as possible. 52 Yet a "transformation" necessarily accompanies the use of
such services. The message inevitably differs because the individual,
seeking to communicate effectively, relies on more than a soapbox, a
street comer, and his unampli:fied voice.
Despite this incongruence, Buckley recognized a first amendment
right to use advanced communication technology in candidate elections, precisely because of its effectiveness. 53 Ballot measure committees afford individuals the same opportunity to communicate
effectively on referendum issues. Only by contributing to a ballot
measure committee can average individuals use these media to express their views. 54 A ballot measure contributor's interest is in this
50. A comparison with candidate contributions illustrates this point. If a candidate contributor makes a contribution that the candidate uses to defray nonspeech related expenses, the
first amendment does not protect every dollar of the contribution because it has resulted in no
speech at all. See text at notes 22-33 supra. But if the candidate uses the contribution to rent a
hall equipped with loudspeakers, the contribution results in speech. The speech, however, is
the candidate's and not the contributor's - the contributor thus has no fundamental free
speech interest in making unlimited contributions. If, on the other hand, the contributor and
candidate shared viewpoints, and the candidate used the contribution for political expression,
the first amendment would afford its greatest protection. Although unrealistic in the federal
candidate context, the contribution in this example is analogous to activities such as lobbying
and legal representation - activities that the Supreme Court has held enjoy full first amendment protection. See Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365
U.S. 127 (1967) (lobbying); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) (litigation).
Candidate contributions will almost always fall into the first two categories. Like direct
expenditures, ballot measure contributions, however, will almost always be analogous to lobbying and litigation.
51. There is no dearth of literature on how to spend money most effectively for political
communication. See, e.g., A. STEINBERG, THE POLITICAL CAMPAIGN HANDBOOK (1976); THE
POLITICAL MARKETPLACE (D. Rosenbloom ed. 1972) (see especially part VII, ''The Professional Campaign Managers," an alphabetical index of all campaign management firms), See
generally THE NEW STYLE IN ELECTION CAMPAIGNS (2d ed. R. Argranoff ed. 1976).
52. Ironically, the sophisticated "packaging" and "delivery" of political communication
might have begun in California with Whitaker and Baxter, a firm that rose to prominence
through its successful management of referendum campaigns. See REFERENDUMS, supra note
2, at 106-07.
53. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. I, 19 (1976) (per curiam).
54. The CARC Court noted that although the limitation prohibited contributions of more
than a modest size "an individual or business entity . . . remains free to spend money in
unlimited amounts, by mass advertising or any other method, to inform the public of its reasons why the measure should be adopted or defeated." 27 Cal. 3d at 829, 614 P.2d at 748, 167
Cal. Rptr. at 90 (emphasis original). But what is the average individual likely to be able lo
secure for his or her direct expenditure dollar? Although it is not clear how much money the
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respect equivalent to the interest that Buckley found sufficient to invalidate direct spending limitations. Divergence of group expression
from the views of individual members remains a possibility, but this
does not justify equating ballot measure contributions, which are
possibly divergent, with candidate contributions, which are almost
"average individual" spends annually on political communication, see Adamany, supra note
24, at 17-28 (few citizens regularly contribute to political parties), it is possible to hazard a
guess at what an "effective" media campaign for or against the ballot measure at issue in
CARC would cost an individual were he to spend directly:
TELEVISION COVERAGE
1. KBHK TV (Field Communications Affiliate)
l. most expensive periods ............................•..•..•. $1,312.00 (mean)
2. before/qfter most expensive periods ......................•.. $ 525.00 (mean)
3. least expensive periods ..........•..•..•................... $ 195.00 (mean)
2.

KDTV (Spanish speaking, SIN Affiliate)
l. most expensive periods ............•.•.....•..•.....•..•..•
2. befare/qfter most expensive periods . . . . . . . • . • . . . . . • . . • • . . . • .
3. least expensive periods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . • . . . . . • . . • . . •

$ 200.00$ 120.00 (range)
$ 85.00 (mean)
$ 40.00 (mean)

[figures are for 30 seconds of broadcast time, mean(s) derived from figures for specific time
periods within general time period indicated.]
SPOT TELEVISION RATES AND DATA, May 15, 1980, at 59.
NEWSPAPER COVERAGE
1. SAN FRANCISCO EXAMINER & CHRONICLE (black & white)
l. 1/4 page ad, l day
a. Examiner •.•....•..........................•..••.••.•
b. Chronicle .•......•.....................•.•..••.•...•
c. Examiner & Chronicle .........•..•........•..•.......
2. 1/8 page ad, l day
a. Examiner ........•..•.•..•.•..•..•.••....•..•........
b. Chronicle .................•.....•..•.•..•..•...•.•..
c. Examiner & Chronicle ..•.............................

$2,028.21
$3,130.40
$6,678.12
$1,014.10
$1,565.20
$3,339.06

[The Chronicle is the evening newspaper, circulation 504,644 (excluding Sunday). The Examiner is the morning newspaper, circulation 157,709 (excluding Sunday). NEWSPAPER RATES
AND DATA, May 12, 1980, at 214-16.] Cost figures from Revised National Rate Card No. 14,
San Francisco Chronicle and Examiner, Jan. I, 1981 (on file with the Michigan Law Review).
2. INDEPENDENT GAZETTE (Berkeley/Richmond area) (black & white) (daily rate)
l. full page ad . • . • . • • . • . • . . • . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . $1,620.00
2. 1/4 page ad . . • . • . • . . . . • . • • . . . . . . • . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $ 405.00
[Circulation of 50,500 (excluding Sunday).] Cost figures from Independent & Gazette Retail
Advertising Rates, Jan. I, 1981 (on file with the Michigan Law Review).
3. WALL STREET JOURNAL (Western Edition) (black & white) (daily rate)
l. 1/8 page ad • . • . . . . . • • . • . • • . • . • • . • . . • . • • . • . . • • . • . . . . . . . . . $1,265.40
2. 1/6 page ad • . • . • . • . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • • • • . • • . • . . • . . • . . . • . • $1,687.20
3. 1/4 page ad . . • . • . . • . . . . . . • . • . . • . • . . • • . • . . • . • . . • • . . . . . . . . $2,530.80
[Circulation of approximately 320,000.] Cost figures from Wall Street Journal Western Edition Advertising Rate Sheet, Jan. I, 1981 (on file with the Michigan Law Review).
The above figures do not include preparation or production costs, or the costs associated
with professional political consulting and media planning. Accordingly, these figures are only
illustrative of what a direct expenditure ballot measure campaign effort would cost a private
individuaL Nevertheless, the magnitude of the figures suggests that the CARC court was misguided in concluding that because the limitations applied only to contributions, they would not
significantly infringe on expression.
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necessarily so. 55
Finally, ballot measure contribution limitations undercut basic
associational rights, for the same reason that direct expenditure ceilings undercut such rights. Such limitations prevent individuals from
effectively amplifying their political communication.56 Buckley does
not demand a different result. Underlying the Court's conclusion
that candidate limitations only marginally restrict a contributor's
freedom of association was its finding that such contributions gener55. The contrary argument was asserted and rejected in First Natl. Bank v. Bellotti, 435
U.S. 765, 792-93, 794 n.34 (1978). The Court acknowledged that the political views of some
shareholders were likely to be at odds with corporate political co=unication regarding a
ballot measure, but concluded that this did not justify lesser first amendment protection for
such co=unication.
In other contexts the Court has rejected similar arguments. See United Mine Workers,
Dist. 12 v. Illinois State Bar Assn., 389 U.S. 217, 223 (1967) (rejecting argument that full-time
attorney retained by Union was likely to compromise members' interests out of loyalty to
Union; possibility "purely theoretical"). As a general matter, the Court has assumed that
groups or associations can engage in activity protected under the first amendment on behalf of
their members because the interest of the group is identical with that of its members. See, e.g. ,
Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961) (group
can lobby Congress to further members' political and economic interests); NAACP v.
Alabama ex rel Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (groups can pursue constitutional rights of
members through litigation). In Buckley the Court reaffirmed the principle that an interference with group activity is "simultaneously an interference with the freedom of the member[s]." 424 U.S. at 22 (quoting Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957) (plurality
opinion)).
Indeed, it has been noted that divergence between individual political views and the political co=unication of groups to which individuals belong is in fact desirable because it promotes the interchange of ideas, and thereby facilitates the process of consensus formation in
society. See R. MICHELS, POLITICAL PARTIES - A SOCIETAL STUDY OF THE OLIGARCHICAL
TENDENCIES OF MODERN DEMOCRACY 36 (1962) ("In essence, democracy in modern society
may be viewed as involving the conflict of organized groups competing for support. . • . This
image of democracy as conflicts of organized groups . . . may be far from the ideal of the
Greek city state or of small Swiss cantons, but in operation as a system it is far better than any
other political system which has been devised."); D. TRUMAN, supra note 24, at 508-09.
Like the larger political system within which they operate, groups formed for the purpose
of political expression and advocacy must acco=odate the differing views of their membership. See J. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM & DEMOCRACY 269 (1947) (one advantage
of the democratic form of government is formation of "elite groups," or decision-making centers, with only episodic participation of voters). See generally Chapman, Voluntary Association
and the Political Theory ofPluralism, in VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONS, supra note 37, at 114:
In one way or another, every political theory faces the various implications of the
distinction and divergence between collective and individual rationality; each attempts to
prescribe and to institutionalize against them. All the dimensions of pluralist politics exhibit a co=on shape and rhythm. For these massive regularities, the political theory of
pluralism offers an abstract and general explanation in the permanent and contrasting
facets of human rationality.
See also, McBride, Voluntary Association: Tlze Basis of an Ideal Model and the ''Democratic" Failure, in VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONS, supra note 37, at 202, 229-30 (arguing that
membership in voluntary associations increases individual responsibility and participation in
social change).
56. An individual's right to spend directly for political co=unication is not less protected
when exercised in concert with others who have similar views. See NAACP v. Alabama ex
rel Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 459 (1958) (I'he association "is the appropriate party to assert
these rights, because it and its members are in every practical sense identical. The Association
. . . is but the medium through which its individual members seek to make more effective the
expression of their own views."); note 37 supra.
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ally are "undifferentiated, symbolic act[s]." 57 Ballot measure contributions, however, are neither "symbolic" nor "undifferentiated.':
Unlike candidate contributors, supporters of ballot measure committees seek to secure effective advocacy of a particular policy. Limitations on their contributions should, therefore, be "subject to the
closest scrutiny.''ss
Close scrutiny will reveal that ballot measure limitations create
more than a "merely theoretical" threat to a contributor's right to
amplify his political views. CARC, for example, upheld a $250 limitation. This will prevent individuals with moderate incomes from
securing the fullest possible access to the indispensable "expensive
modes of communication.''59 The California court concluded that
because only seventeen percent of the total value of contributions
exceeded $250, the limitation was not unduly burdensome. 60 But the
court ignored the value of additional contributions that individuals
might have made had there been no limitation. Instead of trying to
find a level of limitation that would not infringe on contributors'
rights, the CARC court should have followed Buckley's explicit refusal to defer to legislative assessments of what constitutes a "fair" or
"reasonable" political fight. 61 The courts can ensure effective political advocacy only by letting individuals set their own upper limits
on contributions.62
In four important respects, ballot measure contributions are both
distinguishable from candidate contributions and comparable to direct expenditures. Ballot measure limitations reduce the quantity of
political expression and the ability of individuals to associate for the
advancement of common political beliefs. The constitutionality of
ballot measure limitations thus "turns on whether the governmental
interests advanced in [their] support satisfy the exacting scrutiny applicable to limitations on core First Amendment rights of political
expression." 63 Part II considers those governmental interests, and
57. 424 U.S. at 21.
58. 424 U.S. at 25.
59. See notes 20 & 54supra.
60. 27 Cal. 3d at 830, 614 P.2d at 748, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 90.
61. The Buckley Court stated: "In the free society ordained by our Constitution it is not
the government, but the people - individually as citiz.ens and candidates and collectively as
associations and political committees - who must retain control over the quantity and range
of debate . . . ." 424 U.S. at 57.
62. The state's decision to limit contributions to a certain dollar amount will inevitably be
arbitrary because not all individuals will be able to use their resources in an equally effective
manner.
63. 424 U.S. at 44-45. It is important to note that the Buckley Court did not conclude that
candidate contributions deserved no first amendment protection. Rather, the Court found that
"although the Act's contribution and expenditure limitations both implicatefundamental First
Amendment interests, its expenditure ceilings impose significantly more severe restrictions on
protected freedoms of political expression and association than do its limitations on financial
contributions." 424 U.S. at 23 (emphasis added). The Court upheld the contribution limita-
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concludes that they either are not furthered by ballot measure limitations or could be furthered by less restrictive means.
II.

THE STATE INTERESTS

Because ballot measure limitations restrict first amendment
rights, Buckley makes clear that they must withstand "exacting scrutiny." A state or local government may restrict ballot measure contributions only if it "demonstrates a sufficiently important interest
and employs means closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment"
of first amendment freedoms. 64 Courts have not agreed whether ballot measure limitations actually further such a compelling65 state interest.66
Buckley sustained the FECA's candidate limitations solely because of the governmental interest in preventing quid pro quo corruption between contributors and candidates. 67 This concern does
not justify ballot measure limitations. Ballot measure contests do
not involve candidates for public office, and ballot measure contributions do not create political debts of the kind contemplated in Buckley. 68 Large contributions to ballot measure committees influence
only the voters, and only "in a manner protected by the first amendment."69 Because ballot measure limitations are not necessary to
prevent quid pro quo corruption, courts must find other compelling
governmental interests.
The CARC court found compelling Berkeley's interest in preserving the integrity of the referendum process.70 Although the
opinion lacks clarity, it does suggest three more specific governmental interests: lessening abuse of the ballot measure process by narrow
interest groups, reducing apathy, and equalizing political expression.
tions because it found that they served a compelling governmental interest. To the extent that
ballot measure limitations serve no such governmental interest, see Part II infra, Buckley's
distinction between direct expenditure and candidate contributions becomes fess important.
Part rs equation of ballot measure and direct expenditure limitations, however, remains critical because it indicates the severity of the restriction of first amendment rights against which
asserted governmental interests must be balanced.
64. 424 U.S. at 25.
65. The Supreme Court has "employed a variety of descriptive terms: compelling; substantial; subordinating; paramount; cogent; strong." United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367,
376-77 (1968) (footnotes omitted).
66. See note 3 supra.
67. 424 U.S. at 26-29. See Let's Help Florida v. McCrary, 621 F.2d 195, 199 (5th Cir.
1980), appealfiled, 49 U.S.L.W. 3625 (U.S. Dec. 12, 1980) (No. 80-970).
68. First Natl. Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 790 (1978); Let's Help Florida v. McCrary,
621 F.2d 195, 199-200, appealfiled, 49 U.S.L.W. 3625 (U.S. Dec. 12, 1980) (No. 80-970).
69. Let's Help Florida v. McCrary, 621 F.2d 195, 200 (5th Cir. 1980), appeal filed, 49
U.S.L.W. 3625 (U.S. Dec. 12, 1980) (No. 80-970).
70. 27 Cal. 3d at 829, 614 P.2d at 748, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 90.
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Part II considers these asserted interests and demonstrates that they
cannot justify ballot measure limitations.
A. Narrow Interests
The CARC court initially observed that large contributors could
dominate the ballot measure process by overpowering the efforts of
other citizens to disseminate opinions. 71 Because such domination
could transform ballot measures into a "tool of narrow interests," 72
the court concluded that candidate contributions and contributions
to ballot measure committees differed very little in their effect upon
the election process.73 According to the court, contribution limitations would combat this problem by preventing large contributors
from leaving other citizens with a "stilled voice," 74 and by restoring
the power ofreason.75 The court also implied that the ineffectiveness
of disclosure regulations in overcoming narrow interest domination
justified contribution limitations.76

I. Lessening .Domination by Narrow Interests
The problem of narrow interest domination of the political process has troubled many commentators. 77 The "narrow interests"
71. 27 Cal. 3d at 826-27, 614 P.2d at 746, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 88.
72. 27 Cal. 3d at 827, 614 P.2d at 746, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 88.
73. 27 Cal. 3d at 826, 614 P.2d at 746, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 88.
74. 27 Cal. 3d at 827, 614 P.2d at 746, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 88.
75. 27 Cal. 3d at 827, 614 P.2d at 746, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 88.
76. 27 Cal. 3d at 831, 614 P.2d at 749, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 91.
77. The initiative and referendum were originally established in an attempt to limit the
influence of corporations and other "special interest groups" on the legislative process. See
note 79 i'!fra. Those who inveigh against the domination of the electoral process by narrow
interests argue that these interests make disproportionate use of the media to sway voter opinion. See Mastro, Costlow & Sanchez, Taking the Initiative: Corporate Control efthe Referendum Process Through Media Spending and What to IJoAbout It, 32 FED. COM. L.J. 315, 319-20
(1980):
A core value in American Society is that the democratic process works best when the
electorate is well-informed. Therefore the public deserves to have a fair exchange of ideas
and opinions. If one side can dominate any forum of ideas and opinions to the extent that
only its viewpoint is heard, the electorate is ill-equipped to make wise decisions on issues
of public importance. To editorialize their views and to influence the electorate, advocates usually rely on mass media advertising which regularly reaches large audiences. But
mass media advertising, especially on television, is so expensive that only well-financed
organizations, whether corporations or citizens groups, can afford to pay.
Id (footnotes omitted).
Other observers have noted the tension between a commitment to both free political expression and a predominantly laissez-faire economic system:
[F]irst amendment freedoms of speech, assembly, and association protect political activity.
The ordinary exercise of these rights creates only marginal inequalities in political influence. Because financial participation is expandable, however, it produces inequalities that
can be very high and that cannot be ameliorated by real choices open to the citizenry at
large. . . . An ordinary citizen struggles to find the means to contribute $100. Money's
extreme potential for multiple voting points to an important issue of political finance policy in a democracy: preventing gross inequalities in the meaning of the vote.
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whose domination the CARC court feared could include both contributors with "impure" motives and groups with a "disproportionate" impact on the ballot measure process. The Supreme Court,
however, has never recognized a compelling interest that justifies restricting the first amendment rights of these individuals or groups.
In fact, the Court has repeatedly emphasized that a speaker's first
amendment protection does not decrease because he is motivated by
narrow self-interest, whether economic or otherwise apolitical. 78 It
has also underscored the right of groups to pursue their self-interest
through political expression, even though their impact may be regarded by some as disproportionate.79
The CARC court, however, ignored this teaching because of its
concern that the ballot measure process adopted by Californians to
retain control over the legislature80 would somehow be tainted by
Adamany, PAC'S and the .Democratic Financing ofPolitics, 22 Aruz. L. REV. 569, 571 (1980)
(footnotes omitted).
78. The Court has stated that restricting speech because of the interests of the speaker
"amounts to an impermissible legislative prohibition of speech based on the identity of the
interests that spokesmen may represent in public debate over controversial issues and a requirement that the speaker have a sufficiently great interest in the subject to justify communication." First Natl. Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784 (1978). In deciding that commercial
speech deserved first amendment protection because of society's strong interest in the free flow
of co=ercial information, the Supreme Court rejected the notion that speech was unprotected because it is "carried in a form that is 'sold' for profit." Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy
v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 761 (1976). The Court noted that:
Obviously, not all co=ercial messages contain the same or even a very great public
interest element. There are few to which such an element, however, could not be added.
Our pharmacist, for example, could cast himself as a commentator on store-to-store disparities in drug prices . . . . We sec little point in requiring him to do so, and little
difference if he does not.
425 U.S. at 764-65 (1976).
79. The Court stressed this principle in Bellotti when it stated that:
To be sure, corporate advertising may influence the outcome of the vote; this would be its
purpose. But the fact that advocacy may persuade the electorate is hardly a reason to
suppress it: The Constitution "protects expression which is eloquent no less than that
wliich is unconvincing."
435 U.S. at 790 (quoting Kinglsey Intl. Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684, 689 (1959)).
80. Ballot measure enabling legislation is largely a product of the "progressive era" of the
early twentieth century. See generally R. HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM (1955); c. LonINGIER, THE PEOPLE'S LAW (1909); REFERENDUMS, supra note 2, at 1-37; L. TALLIAN, DIRECT
DEMOCRACY (1977).
The progressive movement sought to limit the influence of wealth, special interest groups,
and corporations in the political process. The ballot measure mechanism was one of a host of
reforms aimed at this end:
[The] central programmatic thrust was for a number of reforms in the nation's and state's
law-making machinery, all intended to increase ordinary citizens' participation in and
power over governmental decisions. The main Progressive reforms included the Australian (secret) ballot; nonpartisan elections, especially at the local level; legal regulation of
the organization, membership requirements, finance, and campaign activities of political
parties; the direct primary; the recall of elected officials; and the initiative and referendum.
REFERENDUMS, supra note 2, at 27.
For the view that the ballot measure process has in many respects succeeded as an alternative to the representative (!.e. , legislative) political process, see Bone & Benedict, Perspectives
on .Direct Legislation: Washington State's Experience 1914-1973, 28 W. POL. Q. 330, 349 (1975)
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the participation of "narrow interests." This argument merely assumed its conclusion that the state may limit the ability on "narrow"
interest groups to express their positions on public issues. This conclusion is untenable because the Supreme Court has held that weakening the power of "special interests" cannot justify limitations on
first amendment rights. 81
2. Promoting the "Power of Reason"

The CARC court also found compelling Berkeley's interest in
promoting the "power of reason." California enacted its ballot
measure provisions to enable the electorate to govern directly by majority rule, but large contributions threatened to transform this "vision of direct democracy" into a "tool of narrow interests." 82
According to the court, "[w]hen large contributors use the power of
("[T]he direct legislation process does continue to be a vital part of the state's political system
and culture. Some of the State's most exciting political battles are centered around propositions. . . . The process ... has helped to educate the citizenry on many public problems.");
Price, The Initiative: A Comparative Stale Analysis and Reassessment of a Western Phenomenon, 28 W. PoL. Q. 243, 261-62 (1975) ("The initiative does provide a last resort to the public
to bypass a recalcitrant legislature and or governor . . . . Clearly, initiatives do allow for
decisive decisions on particularly sensitive, hard to resolve, issues.").
81. The argument that the state can control debate on issues of public importance by imposing restrictions on expression based on either the identity or the interests of the speaker was
most recently and resoundingly rejected in First Natl. Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
Bello/Ii involved legislation forbidding corporate expenditures for political communication relating to ballot measure issues not materially affecting the corporation's business interests. 435
U.S. at 768. In striking down the statute, the Court stated:
In the realm of protected speech, the legislature is constitutionally disqualified from
dictating the subjects about which persons may speak and the speakers who may address a
public issue. . . . If a legislature may direct business corporations to "stick to business,"
it also may limit other corporations - religious, charitable, or civic - to their respective
business when addressing the public. Such power in government to channel the expression of views is unacceptable under the First Amendment. Especially where . . . the legislature's suppression of speech suggests an attempt to give one side of a debatable public
question an advantage in expressing its views to the people, the First Amendment is
plainly offended.
435 U.S. at 784-86 (footnotes and citations omitted).
The CARC court did not offer any definition of what constitutes a "narrow interest." If the
CARC court conceived a "narrow interest" to be a particular point of view it was clearly
wrong in holding that such points of view can be constitutionally cordoned out of the arena of
public debate. See, e.g., Police Dept. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972) (''To permit the
continued building of our politics and culture, and to assure self-fulfillment for each individual, our people are guaranteed the right to express any thought, free from government censorship. The essence of this forbidden censorship is content control."). Alternatively, if the
CARC court viewed well-heeled, financially powerful speakers as narrow interests, its holding
is equally erroneous. In rejecting the argument that the state could restrict the expression of
corporations with respect to ballot measure questions because corporations were wealthy and
capable of dominating debate, the court stated: ''The potential impact of this argument . . . is
unsettling. . . . Except in the special context of limited access to the channels of communication ... this concept contradicts basic tenets of First Amendment jurisprudence." First Natl.
Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 791 n.30 (citations omitted). See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966) ("Wealth, like race, creed, or color, is not germane to one's
ability to participate in the electoral process.").
82. 27 Cal. 3d at 827, 614 P.2d at 746, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 88.
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their purse to overcome the power of reason, they thwart the intended purpose" of ballot measures. 83 Contribution limitations, the
court implied, were necessary to promote rational political dialogue.
This justification, however, conflicts with first amendment doctrine,
which bars governmental interference with expression precisely because no single "voice of reason" appeals to all individuals. 84
Even if a single "voice of reason" represented the entire public
interest, and ballot measure committees expressed only "unreasonable" positions, contribution limitations would nevertheless be objectionably paternalistic. The CARC court assumed that voters respond
to the volume or quantity of political communication rather than to
its merit. The court's implicit premise was that the slanted propaganda of free spending interest groups, if unchecked, would confuse
voters into making unwise decisions. 85 These assumptions evince a
paternalism that the Supreme Court has rejected. 86 In recent com83. 27 Cal. 3d at 827, 614 P.2d at 746, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 88.
84. Madison himself appreciated this fact. During the time Madison was working on Federalist Paper # 10, he stated in a letter to Thomas Jefferson that:
Those who contend for a simple Democracy, or a pure republic . . . assume or suppose a
case which is altogether fictitious. They found their reasoning on the idea, that the people
composing the Society, enjoy not only an equality of political rights, but that they have all
precisely the same interests, and the same feelings in every respect. . . . We know however that no society ever did or can consist of so homogenous a mass of Citizens. . . . In
all civilized societies, distinctions are various and unavoidable. . . . In addition to • . .
natural distinctions, artificial ones will be founded, on accidental differences in political,
religious, or other opinions. . . . However erroneous or ridiculous these grounds of dissention and faction may appear to the enlightened Statesman or benevolent philosopher,
the bulk of mankind who are neither Statesmen nor Philosophers, will continue to view
them in a different light.
5 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 17, 28-29 (G. Hunt ed. 1904).
The Supreme Court has also recognized that first amendment protection is essential because no single "voice of reason" leads inevitably to one conclusion on political issues. See,
e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971) (''The Constitutional right of free expression
is powerful medicine in a society as diverse and populous as ours. It is designed and intended
to remove governmental restraints from the arena of public discussion, putting the decision as
to what views shall be voiced largely into the hands of each ofus . . . ."); West Va. State Bd.
of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) ("If there is any fixed star in our constitutional
constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in poli•
tics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion, or force citizens to confess by word or
act their faith therein.").
85. See 21 Cal. 3d at 839, 614 P.2d at 753, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 95 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
The fear is unfounded because it appears that:
California's well-educated voters seemed far more able to cope with intricate initiatives
than had been presumed by political scientists. It may be that the surprising voting results
on initiatives over the last several years is a temporary phenomenon, but for whatever the
reasons, the easy assertions about the apathy, indifference, and susceptible nature of voters can at least be questioned by the California experience.
Price, supra note 80, at 260-61 (footnotes omitted). See REFERENDUMS, supra note 2, at I 1014. "[V]oters who are reasonably alert may well be confronted with more information than
they can absorb. . . . (A) large body of voters appears to know what it is doing." Id. at 112.
86. See Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 545 (1945) (Jackson, J., concurring):
But it cannot be the duty, because it is not the right, of the state to protect the public
against false doctrine. The very purpose of the First Amendment is to foreclose public
authority from assuming a guardianship of the public mind through regulating the press,
speech, and religion. In tliis field every person must be his own watchman for truth,

June 1981]

Note -

Ballot Measure Contributions

1441

mercial speech cases, for example, the Court has assumed that
information is not in itself harmful, that people will perceive their own
best interests if only they are well enough informed, and that the best
means to that end is to open the channels of communication rather
than to close them. . . .
But the choice is not ours to make. . . .
It is precisely this kind of choice, between the dangers of suppressing information, and the dangers of its misuse if it is freely available, that the first amendment makes for us. 87

According to the Court, the Constitution vests in the people, not in
the legislatures or courts, the responsibility for judging and evaluating conflicting ideas. 88
·
Berkeley presented no evidence that the electorate was incapable
of performing its evaluative role. It is reasonable to assume that the
average voter understands that self-interested groups sponsor and
support ballot measures. 89 The first amendment contemplates that
voters will consider the source and credibility of the advocate in
evaluating the relative merits of conflicting arguments. 90 But the
conflicting arguments must be adequately presented to the voters.
Because positions on ballot measure issues do not generally divide
along party lines, political parties rarely contribute actively to ballot
measure debate. 91 Communication by ballot measure committees
thus serves an important informational need, and contribution limitations restrict expression that may be essential to informed decision
making.
3. Empirical Evidence of Domination
The empirical evidence buttresses the conclusion that first
amendment theory compels: lessening interest group domination is
not a compelling justification for ballot measure limitations. Finanbecause the forefathers did not trust any government to separate the true from the false
for us.
Accord, Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 95 (1940). See generally Note, Restrictions on
Electric Utility Advertising, 78 MICH. L. REV. 433 (1980).
87. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748,
770 (1976).
88. First Natl. Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 791 (1978).
89. 27 Cal. 3d at 838, 614 P.2d at 753, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 95 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
90. 27 Cal. 3d at 840, 614 P.2d at 755, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 97 (Richardson, J., dissenting)
(quoting First Natl. Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 791-92 (1978)). See generally A.
MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 34.
91. Typically, there is an "absence of the party label on ballot measures and a general lack
of party activity." REFERENDUMS, supra note 2, at 114. Another commentator has noted that
although "parties can be extremely important in shaping opinion on the propositions, . . . this
influence is limited (and made difficult to examine fully) by the fact that the parties take positions on only a few ballot measures. . . . They do not wish their position on the propositions
to harm them in the partisan races - after all, every stand alienates somebody." Meuller,
Voting on the Propositions: Ballot Patterns and Historical Trends in California, 63 AM. POL.
Sc1. REV. ll97, 1206-07 (1969) (emphasis deleted).
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cially powerful and well organized interests might "dominate" the
ballot measure process, first, as the only groups that can afford to
qualify ballot measures, and second, as the groups whose positions
consistently prevail in elections. Both tests of domination reveal that
control of the California ballot measure process has eluded the powerful interests feared by the CARC court.
First, powerful interests have no monopoly on qualifying ballot
measures. Qualifying a ballot measure is difficult and expensive in
California,92 but less affluent and poorly organized groups have
placed a number of measures on the ballot. 93 Ballot measure limitations, moreover, do not enable poorly financed or understaffed
groups to amass the 300,000 and 500,000 petition signatures required
to qualify referendums and initiatives. 94 In fact, contribution limitations may make the qualification process more difficult for individuals with modest incomes by reducing their ability to cooperate with
others.95 Thus limitations may increase "narrow interest" domination of the qualification process.
The second test of control - successful advocacy of ballot measures - similarly refutes the domination hypothesis. "Narrow interests" have failed to thwart the will of the people in ballot measure
contests. High powered groups have been notably unsuccessful advocates:
What may one conclude about initiative campaigns? Certainly, they
are risky investments ... Between 1964 and 1976 no major economic
group was able to enact an initiative measure. Realtors and land developers, state employees, agri-business, farm labor, and greyhound
racing interests all failed in their attempt to bypass the legislative process. Instead, victories were achieved by groups with minimum economic clout but with the ability to capitalize on high public interest in
such contrasting issues as coastal conservation and the death penalty.96
California's actual experience makes clear that the CARC court re-

lied more on suspicion than on hard evidence that spending has a
controlling influence on ballot measure results or that limitations are
necessary to prevent "narrow interest" domination. 97
92. See REFERENDUMS, supra note 2, at 101.
93. Price, supra note 80, at 260.
94. See REFERENDUMS, supra note 2, at 101.
95. See note 54 supra.
96. REFERENDUMS, supra note 2, at 106. See Meuller, supra note 91; Price, supra note 80,
at 260.
97. The CARC court's suspicion seems totally unfounded, given the demonstrable failure
of major special interest groups in California to pass any initiative. Although it has been
suggested that special interests, generally corporate interests, have been successful in b!ocki11g
the passage of popular measures, see S. LYDENBERG, supra note 41, at 30-31 (corporate campaign opposing anti-smoking measure employed fraudulent advertising), this generalization
must be discounted in light of the fact that corporate opposition failed to block the passage of a
major environment ballot measure in California. See Lutrin & Settle, supra note 41, at 369-71.
In short, there is
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Contribution Limitations as a Substitute for .Disclosure

The CARC court feared that the anonymity surrounding ballot
measure contributions would mislead citizens, and apparently concluded that the ineffectiveness of disclosure laws justified limitations.
According to the court, disclosure laws inadequately curtail the influence of "narrow interests" because campaign propaganda and the
identification of contributors are not simultaneous; voters form impressions on campaign issues before committees reveal their source
of financing, and evaluation of contributor motives may thus come
too late.98 Recent studies of candidate elections indicate that disclosure legislation may not effectively correct this problem. 99 Two factors indicate that the need for disclosure may be even greater in
ballot measure elections. First, in ballot measure contests, the voters
evaluate ideas rather than candidates. Second, ballot measure committees often receive contributions from large, out-of-state corporations, 100 whose motives will be of interest to local voters.
The Supreme Court has recognized that disclosure serves a legitimate state interest, 101 but it has never held that governments can impose contribution limitations to complement or substitute for
disclosure. Mandatory disclosure seeks to enrich political communication; ballot measure limitations merely restrict it. Contribution
limitations improve or replace disclosure legislation only by suppressing political expression to levels that make disclosure an academic issue. Even the impossibility of devising more effective
disclosure laws, if proved, would not justify such a restriction of
political expression.
Berkeley, however, did not attempt to show that its disclosure
laws are inadequate and cannot be improved. Berkeley requires ballot measure committees to report the names of contributors, their
no neat correlation . . . between campaign expenditures and campaign results. Even if
superiority in expenditures and success at the polls always ran together, the flow of funds
. . . might simpfy reflect . . . prior popular appeal rather than create it. Our understanding of voting behavior is not so precise that all the financial and non-financial factors that
contribute to success can be sorted out with confidence. Yet it is clear that under some
conditions the use of funds can be decisive. And under others, no amount of money spent
. . . could alter the outcome . . . financial outlays cannot guarantee victory in elections.
A. HEARD, supra note 28, at 16 (1960).
98. 27 Cal. 3d at 831, 614 P.2d at 749, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 91.
99. See Adamany, supra note 77, at 598:
Disclosure laws generate more information than can be mastered by the media, the politicians, or the voters - at least in the short run of a campaign. Media may show little
interest in political financing practices, and their partisan or editorial positions may color
their coverage of such practices by competing candidates. Voters, too, are likely to evaluate such information through a "perceptual screen" that is colored by their own partisan
allegiances and candidate preferences.
100. See S. LYDENBERG, supra note 41,parsim; Mastro, Costlow & Sanchez, supra note 77.
101. See, e.g., First Natl. Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 792 n.32 (1978); Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. l, 67 (1976).

Michigan Law Review

1444

[Vol. 79:1421

addresses, and the amounts contributed. 102 The city then publishes
this information in local newspapers prior to the election. 103 If the
current laws are ineffective, Berkeley could require committees to
make more extensive disclosures contemporaneously with their
messages. More demanding disclosure regulations would infringe
on political expression less than an absolute ban on contributions
over a certain dollar amount. The city could also increase its use of
voter information pamphlets. 104 For many voters these pamphlets
are a primary source of information on ballot measure issues, 105 and
other states have used them successfully. These alternatives and
others, all less restrictive of first amendment rights than contribution
limitations, were not adequately explored by the CARC court.
A reduction of "narrow interest" domination is unnecessary, violates the first amendment, and is attainable by less restrictive means.
This asserted governmental interest, therefore, cannot justify ballot
measure limitations. The next section considers whether a desire to
reduce apathy can justify such limitations.
B. Apathy

Apathy is a vague concept, but the CARC court defined it as "indifference, unconcern, and lack ofparticipation," 106 and found com102. Berkeley, Cal., Election Reform Act of 1974, § 412(9) (Ord. No. 4700-N.S.) requires
ballot measure committees to file in their campaign statement:
The full name of each person from whom a contribution or contributions totalling fifty
dollars ($50) or more has been received together with his or her street address, occupation,
and the name of his or her employer, if any, or the principal place of business he or she is
self-employed, the amount which he or she contributed, the date on which each contribution was received during the period covered by the campaign statement, and the cumulative amount he or she contributed.
103. Berkeley, Cal., Election Reform Act of 1974, § 112 (Ord. No. 4700-N.S.) provides:
The City of Berkeley shall publish, in all newspapers whose editorial offices are in
Berkeley, which during at least six (6) months of the year generally publish a newspaper
at least five days a week and at least two-thirds of whose newspapers are delivered in
Berkeley a list of all contributors of over $50 to all candidates or committees under the
heading of Public Notice, at least two times in the seven days prior to the election. In
addition, the City of Berkeley shall publish a list of all contributors of over $50 to all
candidates or committees under the heading Public Notice, at such time or times and in
such newspaper or newspapers as the Commission shall find is appropriate to inform
minority group members of such contributions. In addition, the City of Berkeley may
publish notices in such newspapers or other media as the Commission shall find is appropriate to inform the public.
104. Berkeley mails a voter information pamphlet to all registered voters. The ballot
measure election at issue in the CARC case was consolidated with the election for city council
and school district members. The pamphlet ran 67 pages; less than two pages were devoted to
analysis of the ballot measure. See City of Berkeley, California, Sample Ballot & Voter Information Pamphlet, Consolidated General Municipal Election and Peralta Community College
District 41-42 (1977) (on file with the Michigan Law Review).
105. See

REFERENDUMS,

supra note 2, at 112 n.45.

106. 27 Cal. 3d at 828, 614 P.2d at 747, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 89 (quoting Johnson v. Hamilton,
15 Cal. 3d 461, 471, 541 P.2d 881, 886, 125 Cal. Rptr. 129, 134 (1975)),
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pelling Berkeley's interest in reducing voter apathy. 107 The court's
defense of ballot measure limitations premised that many individuals shun political activity because they feel dwarfed by the spending
of others. 108 The CARC court assumed that it could constitutionally
restrict the expression of some individuals to encourage the participation of others. A finding of apathy, however, would not justify
restrictions on expression because a desire to reduce apathy assumes
an optimal or minimally acceptable level of political debate and participation. The first amendment prohibits precisely this sort of calculation.109 In rejecting the contention that spending in federal
107. 27 Cal. 3d at 829, 614 P.2d at 748, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 90.
108. 27 Cal. 3d at 828, 614 P.2d at 747, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 89 (quoting BERG, CORRUPTION
IN THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM 47 (1976)) (" 'The mass of citizens have tended to shun
the opportunity to donate to campaign coffers and to participate in other forms of political
activity because they felt their limited resources would be outmatched by a small group of rich
and influential "angels" . . . .' ").
109. The Buckley Court stated that "[t]he First Amendment denies government the power
to determine that spending to promote one's political views is wasteful, excessive, or unwise."
424 U.S. at 57. The state is forbidden to make this calculation because the first _amendment
itself embodies the relevant decision:
We have decided to be self-governed. We have measured the dangers and the values of
the suppression of the freedom of public inquiry and debate. And, on the basis of that
measurement, having regard for the public safety, we have decided that the destruction of
freedom is always unwise, that freedom is always expedient. The conviction recorded by
that decision is not a sentimental vagary about the "natural rights" of individuals. It is a
reasoned and sober judgment as to the best available method of guarding the public
safety.
A. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 34, at 57.
Other commentators argue that although unfettered individual expression furthers society's
long-run interest, individual expression would still merit protection even if this were not the
case. See Baker, supra note 47, at 46:
The liberty model holds that the free speech clause protects not a marketplace but
rather an arena of individual liberty from certain types of governmental restrictions.
Speech is protected not as a means to a collective good but because of the value of speech
conduct to the individual. The liberty theory justifies protection because of the way the
protected conduct fosters individual self-realization and self-determination without improperly interferring with the legitimate claims of others.
Dworkin also argues that individual rights cannot be restricted merely because society finds
the restriction expedient:
The institution of rights against the government is not a gift of God, or an ancient ritual,
or a national sport. It is a complex and troublesome practice that makes the Government's job of securing the general benefit more difficult and more expensive.
. . . It makes sense to say that a man has a fundamental right against the government,
in the strong sense, like free speech, if that right is necessary to protect his dignity. . . . It
does not make sense otherwise.
R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 199 (1978). See also R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE
AND UTOPIA 32-33 (1975) (emphasis original):
But why may not one violate persons for the greater social good? Individually, we each
sometimes choose to undergo some pain or sacrifice for a greater benefit or to avoid a
greater harm. . . . Why not, similarly, hold that some persons have to bear some costs
that benefit some other person more, for the sake of the overall social good? But there is
no social entity with a good that undergoes some sacrifice for its own good. There are only
individual people, with their own individual lives. Using one of these people for the benefit of others, uses him and benefits the others. Nothing more. What happens is that something is done to him for the sake of others. Talk of an overall social good covers this
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elections had grown excessively, Buckley reiterated a fundamental
principle:
In the free society ordained by our Constitution it is not the government but the people - individually as citizens and candidates and collectively as associations and political committees - who must retain
control over the quantity and range of debate on public issues in a
political campaign. no
The CARC court also assumed the existence of a causal nexus

between large ballot measure contributions and voter apathy in California.111 Apathy is a complicated and poorly understood state of
mind that reflects socioeconomic and demographic factors, individual responses to particular issues, and the socialization of the family.112 Voter turnout, for example, has been explained by both
up. . . . He does not get some overbalancing good from his sacrifice, and no one is entitled to force this upon him - least of all a state or government that claims his allegiance.
llO. 424 U.S. at 57.
Ill. 27 Cal. 3d at 828, 614 P.2d at 747, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 89. The court relied on BERO,
supra note 108, whose conclusions were not specifically addressed to the California ballot
measure process. As the dissent observed:
[T)his wholly untested political hypothesis is not based upon any record but rather upon
the opinions and conclusions of "commentators on our political scene," "a political sc1en•
tist," or a "student of the California initiative process.'
. . . [T)hese opinions do not constitute the hard evidentiary support needed to
demonstrate a state's present and compelling interest in the suppression of the multiple
First Amendment rights of our California citizens. The existence of such a threat and its
potential are wholly undocumented.
27 Cal. 3d at 835, 614 P.2d at 751-52, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 93-94 (Richardson, J., dissenting)
(emphasis original).
The CARC court's reliance on Professor Berg's general commentary on corruption in the
political system is instructive because it demonstrates the danger of relying on broad generalizations and facile assertions in situations where individual political expression is at stake.
Berg is in fact a staunch supporter of the ballot measure process, and his support for a proposed national ballot measure process was based on his "systematic analysis of what has occurred in California." Berg stated: ''The problem of money is a problem of politics. It is not
unique to the initiative process. It affects other aspects of our society, I would argue, adversely.'' But Berg stated that the
fundamental strength of (the ballot measure process is that people) deal with issues. You
debate issues. You debate them on their merits. You do not have to deal with the question of image. You do not have to deal with the question of personality. People deal with
these issues as they are.
It seems to me that out of the debate that will occur over these kinds of issues people
are going to be more informed. I do not think there is any question about that. I suspect
that my own faith is based upon looking at the experience in the state of California and
elsewhere. I would like to believe that the people will in most cases make the right judgment.
Voter Initiative Constitutional Amendment: Hearings on S.J. Res. 67 Before the Subcomm. on
the Constitution ofthe Senate Comm on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 47, 49 (1977) (testi•
mony of Professor Berg).
112. The classic study of electoral behavior is A. CAMPBELL, THE AMERICAN VOTER
(1960). Campbell believed that party identification was the principal factor in voting choice,
and that coherent belief patterns, or ideologies, were largely absent in the mass electorate. See
also Pomper, The Impact of The American Voter on Political Science, 93 PoL. Sci. Q. 617,
621-25 (1978) (indexing research supporting or refuting propositions advanced in The American Voter). See generally w. CROTTY, POLITICAL REFORM AND THE AMERICAN EXPERIMENT
46-57; Scammon, Electoral Participation, 371 ANNALS 59 (1967) (demonstrating that voter
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sophisticated economic theory and the weather. 113 Large expenditures may not in fact influence participation; if individuals decide for
independent reasons not to participate, ballot measure limitations
would represent a misguided attempt to encourage participation in
the face of individual decisions not to exercise first amendment
rights. 114 Because such limitations do not affect the size of direct
expenditures, they represent a futile attempt as well.
The evidence before the CARC court not only failed to establish
the crucial causal link between large contributions and voter apathy,
but also fell short of demonstrating that apathy was a problem in
California. Instead of requiring Berkeley to submit evidence of apathy and prove that ballot measure limitations in fact curtailed apathy, 115 the Court based its findings on judicial notice and
conjecture. 116 Had the court looked to objective evidence, it would
turnout is greater among the well educated, older, male, nonminority, higher income segments
of the population); Verba, JJemocratic Participation, 373 ANNALS 53 (1967), and sources cited
therein.
113. Verba, supra note 112, at 63.
Voter apathy has been attributed to the changing nature of society and individual feelings
of powerlessness. J. LIVINGSTON & R. THOMPSON, THE CONSENT OF THE GOVERNED 298 (2d
ed. 1966) (quoting D. RIESMAN & N. GLAZER, FACES IN THE CROWD 33 (1952)):
In the traditional democratic model . . . politics was viewed as the arena in which
men could control their collective destinies. Politics was a means by which society could
be continuously adapted to men's moral purposes and public goals. A paradox of recent
society is that while politics increasingly affects men's lives as the boundaries of governmental activity are expanded, the individual's feeling of control and competence and his
sense of mastery over the future seem to have diminished.
Other scholars make a convincing argument that state-imposed restrictions and failure to
promote the franchise account for low voter turnout in the United States. See Zisner & Dawson, Encouraging Voter Participation, in POLITICAL FINANCE 221, 227 (H. Alexander ed. 1979).
See generally W. CROTTY, supra note I 12, at 239-42 (comparing franchise restriction in 1860
with franchise restriction in 1968 on state-by-state basis).

I 14. The state probably cannot compel individuals to express political views. See Wooley
v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) (individual cannot be punished for covering state motto,
"live free or die," stamped on license plate; the freedom "of thought protected by the First
Amendment . . . includes both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking
at all."); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (school children
could not be compelled to salute the American flag). Though the practice would be contrary to
historical tradition, there is no apparent constitutional objection to requiring individuals to
register to vote and make an appearance at a polling place on election day. Compulsory registration would no more intrude upon individual liberty than compulsory draft registration or
other regulations that the state imposes. Other democracies require minimal political participation from their citizens. See K. PHILLIPS & P. BLACKMAN, ELECTORAL REFORM AND
VOTER PARTICIPATION 23-34, 98-99 (comparing electoral laws of various countries and voter
turnout). Read narrowly, Wooley and Barne/le may only preclude the state from requiring
citizens to espouse official messages or ideologies. The state could avoid these difficulties by
providing a "no preference" option for the individual.
115. See, e.g., Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 362 (1976) ("burden is on the government to
show the existence" of a compelling interest). See note 9 supra.

I 16. 27 Cal. 3d at 828, 614 P.2d at 747, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 89. Berkeley argued that the
ballot measure committee "did not show as a matter of law . . • that a $250.00 contribution
limitation in a small local election failed to comply with the . . . concerns analyzed by the
Buckley court." Brief for App., supra note 5, at 8. Berkeley was mistaken on the burden of
proof question. See note 116 supra. The City argued that "[t]he contribution limitation at
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have concluded that Californians are not apathetic about ballot
measures.
Citizen apathy toward ballot measures could manifest itself in
three ways. First, one could infer indifference toward ballot measures if citizens considered few and only a narrow range of ballot
measure issues. Between 1960 and 1976, however, Californians used
the ballot measure process twenty-six times. 117 They have considered issues as diverse as decriminalization of marijuana and reinstatement of the death penalty; they have voiced opinions on pay
television, greyhound racing and school busing; they have limited
property taxes and defeated anti-homosexual and anti-smoking
measures. 118 Poorly organized groups lacking financial clout qualified many of these measures. 119 Second, individuals might sense the
futility of their participation, and fail to communicate unpopular positions or oppose "narrow interests" during ballot measure campaigns. But Californians have formed committees to take unpopular
positions and to fight powerful interest groups. The CARC for example, opposed a rent-control measure that was probably popular in
a university community such as Berkeley. 120 At the statewide level,
smaller interest groups have formed ballot measure coalitions and
effectively used free media time under the FCC fairness doctrine. 121
Third, citizens might fail to vote on ballot measure issues. In all but
four of the twenty-six ballot measure elections between 1960 and
1976, however, over 90% of those voting in the general elections also
voted on the ballot measure issue. 122 Controversial issues drew a
higher percentage. 123
Ballot measure limitations are invalid unless the "record or legislative findings" demonstrate that large ballot measure contributions
issue is supported by a legitimate governmental interest," Brief for Apps., supra note 5, at 6,
but it did not submit evidence that the limitation would in fact curtail apathy.
117. See REFERENDUMS, supra note 2, at 95.
118. Id. at 94-95.
119. See text at note 93 supra.
120. Berkeley voters eventually passed a ballot measure establishing a Rent Stabilization
Board empowered to fix rental rates on all real property within the city. Berkeley Election
Statistics, Rent Stabilization and Eviction for Good Cause Program (election of June 3, 1980)
(on file with the Michigan Law Review).
121. See Lutrin & Settle, supra note 41, at 370. But see Mastro, Costlow & Sanchez, supra
note 77, at 327-33 (arguing that "gross imbalances" in the coverage of issues resulted despite
the use of free media time by citizen groups under the FCC fairness doctrine).
122. REFERENDUMS, supra note 2, at 94.
123. Id. at 108: "In general, the vote on initiatives - reflecting their more controversial
nature - almost always exceeds by several percentage points the vote for constitutional
amendments proposed by the legislature." This statement accords with the experience in other
states. See Bone & Benedict, supra note 80, at 340 ("questions of governmental structure and
reform bring out the lowest participation"). A 1973 tax and expenditure proposal drew a turnout in excess of 98%, even though it did not coincide with a candidate election. REFEREN·
DUMS, supra note 2, at 94.
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"threaten
imminently to undermine democratic processes,
thereby denigrating rather than serving First Amendment interests." 124 The three indicia for apathy indicate that unlimited spending for political communication does not imminently threaten the
ballot measure process. A desire to reduce apathy cannot justify
contribution limitations absent three findings. First, there must be
evidence of substantial apathy. Second, there must be a causal relationship between large contributions and apathy. Third, the court
must find that restricting political expression is an effective and constitutionally permissible means for reducing apathy. The CARC
court substituted assumptions for proof on each of these points, and
its treatment of the apathy question must, therefore, be rejected. The
next section will examine a final possible interest in contribution limitations.
C. Equalization

The CARC court expressed concern not only for nonparticipants,
but also for participants in the ballot measure process who felt that
their contributions were insignificant. A "free marketplace" of political ideas implies that the poor as well as the rich can effectively
present their views. 125 The court concluded that ballot measure limitations "assur[e] voters that their vote and their participation,
whether in the form of money or services, are significant." 126 Although it is not clear whether the court considered equalization as an
independent goal or as merely another facet of the "narrow interests" problem, it apparently thought that the tendency of ballot
measure limitations to equalize contributors' ability to participate
had justificatory force.
Proponents of contribution limitations argue that unrestricted
124. First Natl. Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 762, 789 (1978).
125. See, e.g., T. EMERSON, supra note 34, at 629: "In general, the government must affirmatively make available the opportunity for expression as well as protect it from encroachment. This means that positive measures must be taken to assure the ability to speak despite
economic or other barriers."
Baker, supra note 47, at 55:
The marketplace works if and only if all people are equally able to participate in making
or influencing the choice. Moreover, providing each person a roughly equal opportunity
to generate equal quantities of carefully packaged messages increases the role of reason;
the equalization neutralizes the advantages which pacfaging presently gives to wellfinanced perspectives. . . . [T)he marketplace of ideas seems perfectly coherent as long
as people have equal opportunities (e.g., equal resources) for participating.
126. 27 Cal. 3d at 829, 614 P.2d at 747-48, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 90. The concept of significant
participation is as vague as that of apathy. The CARC court was probably concerned, as are
some co=entators, see note 77 supra, that soµie citizens would be demoralized because their
participation would seem less effective than that of individuals or groups able to spend greater
amounts of money to promote their political viewpoints. But this approach falsely assumes
that large spenders speak with a single voice, a notion that the Supreme Court rejected in
Bello/Ii. See 435 U.S. at 785 n.22 ("Corporations, like individuals or groups, are not homogenous.").
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spending for communication results in multiple voting, 127 or at least
in repetition that impedes the search for "truth" in the electoral process.128 They conclude that such limitations open the marketplace to
diverse views. Certain language in Buckley and other recent
Supreme Court cases supports this position. The Court has validated governmental action that "facilitate[s] and enlarge[s] public
discussion and participation in the electoral process." 129 It applied
this principle to uphold public financing of presidential campaigns
and "fairness" regulation of the electronic media. 130 And in Reynolds v. Sims, 131 the Court held that an individual is entitled to "an
equally e.ffective" voice in the political process. These decisions indicate that equalization is a legitimate goal in certain contexts.
Opponents of ballot measure limitations, on the other hand, argue that the first amendment protects political communication from
any governmental intereference. They claim that unfettered individual expression, 132 not restrictions on speech, 133 promotes a free mar127. A. HEARD, supra note 28, at 648:
A deeply cherished slogan of American democracy is "one man-one vote." . . . By their
talents and energies, some men have always taken greater part in government than others
and thus, in a way, cast more than one vote. Concern over the private financing of political campaigns sterns in significant measure from the belief tliat a gift is an especially
important kind of vote.
128. The CARC court, for example, believed that "large contributors use their purse to
overcome the power of reason." 27 Cal. 3d at 827, 614 P.2d at 746, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 88.
129. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 92-93 (1976).
130. 424 U.S. at 92-93 (upholding public financing of Presidential Campaigns). See Red
Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367,377 (1969) ("The broadcaster must give adequate
coverage to public issues . . . and coverage must be fair in that it accurately reflects the oppos•
ing views.").
See generally Kalven, Broadcasting, Public Policy and the First Amendment, 10 J.L. &
EcoN. 15 (1967); Robinson, The FCC and the First Amendment: Observations on 40 Years of
Radio and Television Regulation, 52 MINN, L. REV. 67 (1967).
131. 377 U.S. 533, 565 (1964).
132. See, e.g., z. CHAFEE, THE BLESSINGS OF LIBERTY 108 (1956): "(T]he First Amendment and other parts of the law erect a fence inside which men can talk. The law-makers,
legislators and officials stay on the outside of that fence. But what the men inside the fence say
when they are let alone is no concern of the law." The Court has traditionally viewed the first
amendment as a guarantor of unrestricted interplay of beliefs and ideas; it has often rejected
the notion of governmental regulation designed to achieve a more "balanced" or perfect marketplace. See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940):
In the realm of religious faith, and in that of political belief, sharp differences arise, In
both fields the tenets of one man may seem the rankest error to his neighbor. To persuade others to his own point of view, the pleader, as we know, at times, resorts to exaggeration, to vilification of men who have been, or are, prominent. . . . But the people of
this nation have ordained in the light of history, that, in spite of the probability of excesses
and abuses, these liberties are, in the long view, essential to enlightened opinion and right
conduct on the part of the citizens of a democracy.
See United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362,372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943) (Hand, J,) ("[The
first amendment] presupposes that right conclusions are more likely to be gathered out of a
multitude of tongues, than through any kind of authoritative selection. To many this is, and
always will be, folly; but we have staked upon it our all.").
133. Even Emerson, who argues for affirmative state efforts to promote the "system of
expression," points out that:
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ketplace of ideas. Ballot measure limitations allow the state to
decide that an individual's expression conflicts with its view of an
ideal marketplace. The Supreme Court, however, has never sanctioned an attempt to equalize political influence by restricting
speech. 134 In fact, Buckley explicitly rejected this approach: "[T]he
concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements of
our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly
foreign to the First Amendment." 135 The Court reaffirmed this position in Be!!otti.1 36 Several additional objections to equalization
through ballot measure limitations can also be raised.
First, ballot measure limitations "equalize" only haphazardly.
Ballot measures are only one part of the electoral process, and contributions to ballot measure committees are only one form of ballot
measure spending. Ballot measure limitations do not limit direct expenditures, which are protected under Buckley; they "equalize" only
the expression of contributors to ballot measure committees. 137
Courts should not underestimate the importance of this point. Ballot
measure limitations will not reduce the political expression of
[W]hile certain limited forms of control may improve the performance of the system, such
controls cannot be imposed on any broad scale without destroying the system altogether.
This is true not only because the government has no authority to determine the content or
value of particular expression. Even if the regulation does not touch on such matters, the
mere presence of the government, with its apparatus for investigating, deciding and enforcing, is repressive and likely to inhibit the system.
T. EMERSON, supra note 34, at 633-34.
134. See, e.g., Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (invalidating
a state statute requiring newspapers to make available space at no cost for replies from candidates criticized in editorials).
135. 424 U.S. at 48-49.
136. First Natl. Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 790-91 (1978) (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. l, 48-49 (1976)).
137. The CARC court's reasoning that the contribution limitations passed muster under
the first amendment, or were less onerous than they might be, because individuals remained
free to spend directly, 27 Cal. 3d at 829, 614 P.2d at 748, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 90, runs counter to
several Supreme Court decisions. In Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974) (per curiam),
for example, the Court reversed a conviction under a flag misuse statute for hanging a flag with
a peace symbol attached upside down in a private residence. The Court rejected the lower
court's reasoning that the state could prevent the defendant from treating the flag as he did
because there were "thousands of other means available" for expressing his position. 418 U.S.
at 411 n.4 (quoting State v. Spence, 81 Wash. 2d 788, 800, 506 P.2d 293, 301 (1973)). Similarly,
in Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748
(1976), the Court rejected the argument that a state prohibition of prescription drug price
advertising was justifiable because consumers could secure the information from alternative
sources. 425 U.S. at 757 n.15. And in Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (holding
invalid an ordinance prohibiting the door-to-door distribution of handbills where the state
interests asserted could be achieved by less drastic means), the Court stated that "one is not to
have the exercise of his liberty of expression in appropriate places abridged on the plea that it
may be exercised in some other place." 308 U.S. at 163. The availability of alternative channels of communication becomes relevant only when the restriction on speech arises as a result
of government regulation that is otherwise a "reasonable time, place or manner'' regulation.
In such cases the Court will strike down the regulation if it has the effect, even incidentally or
accidentally, of foreclosing the dissemination of expression by certain speakers or the receiving
of communication by certain listeners.
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wealthy persons and groups, whose direct expenditures are large
enough to guarantee access to the most effective modes of communication. Rather, limitations will affect persons of more modest
means, who are unable to afford mass media communication unless
they pool resources with others similarly situated. 138 Because limitations will restrict such cooperation, they may actually impede equalization. Second, the patterns of expression that contribution
limitations alter are caused by income inequality. 139 Although the
first amendment may not oblige the government to provide the resources necessary for individuals to express political views effectively, 140 the state could encourage political expression less
restrictively through redistributive taxing and spending. 141
A desire to "equalize" does not justify ballot measure limitations.
Because of their haphazard impact, these limitations do not equalize
political influence. They do, however, throttle political expression 142
and aim to equalize by a means that is more drastic than use of the
tax laws or the budget. Ballot measure limitations thus unnecessarily conflict with the first amendment's primary concern - protection of individual political expression. 143
138. See note 54 supra.
139. Income inequality is a longstanding phenomenon in this country. See generally
Miller, Rein, Roby & Gross, Poverty, Inequality, and Co'?flict, 373 ANNALS 16 (1967).
140. See San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I, 36 (1973) ("[W]e
have never presumed to possess either the ability or the authority to guarantee to the citizenry
the most e.ffective speech or the most ieformed electoral choice.") (emphasis original). The
Court in Rodriguez rejected the contention that unequal funding of local school systems violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. The plaintiffs argued, inter
alia, that equal educational resources were necessary if individuals were to make "intelligent
utilization of the right to vote." Cf. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (upholding so-called
"Hyde Amendment" limiting federal funding under Medicaid to abortions necessary to pre•
serve life of mother, or in cases of rape or incest); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (upholding state refusal to provide Medicaid funds for "non-therapeutic" first trimester abortions);
Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974) (the state need not provide counsel for indigent defendants
for discretionary state appeals or application for Supreme Court review).
141. Buckley specifically rejected the argument that public financing of federal campaigns
violated the first amendment. The Court upheld the scheme under the general welfare clause,
and merely noted that "every appropriation made by Congress uses public money in a manner
to which some taxpayers object." 424 U.S. at 92. But cf. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ,, 431
U.S. 209 (1977) (holding that nonmembers of public employee unions required to pay a "service fee" in lieu of union dues were entitled to a refund of funds spent for ideological and
political communication unrelated to collective bargaining activities).
142. See notes 41-63 supra. The fact that a limitation does not completely prohibit expression does not seem relevant. If spending money for political communication is speech, as
Buckley held, every dollar that the contributor is prohibited from contributing amounts to a
restriction of expression. Moreover, the very purpose of the restriction is to limit expression.
Ballot measure limitations therefore run afoul of the O'Brien requirement that a regulation
affecting speech not have as its principal aim the suppression of expression. United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968). See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 16-17; note 19 supra.
143. Political expression lies at "the very core of the first amendment." Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. at 39 (quoting Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 32 (1968)). See First Natl. Bank v.
Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 777 n.12 (quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964));
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CONCLUSION

Ballot measure limitations restrict the free speech rights of individual contributors to the same extent as the direct expenditure limitations that Buckley struck down. They restrict the use that
individuals of modest income levels can make of the mass media and
directly curtail the contributor's ability to associate with others for
"effective amplification" of political views. As direct abridgments of
"core" first amendment rights, the constitutionality of ballot measure
limitations turns on whether they can withstand "exacting scrutiny."
They cannot. Because they either are not furthered by the limitations or are attainable by less restrictive means, none of the asserted
state interests justify limitations.
Only by allowing individuals to set their own upper limits on
ballot measure contributions can courts guarantee a fair hearing to
all sides of a referendum issue. Inevitably arbitrary state dollar limitations frustrate this goal. Upholding ballot measure limitations
would be tantamount to giving constitutional sanction to the "not
altogether pleasing prospect that a citizen's most fundamental First
Amendment rights may expand and contract with the Consumer
Price Index." 144

Milkwagon Driver's Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287, 301-02 (1941)
(Black, J., dissenting):
I view the guaranties of the First Amendment as the foundation upon which our government structure rests and without which it could not continue to endure as conceived and
planned. Freedom to speak and write about public questions is as important to the life of
our government as is the heart to the human body. In fact, this privilege is the heart of
our government. If that heart be weakened, the result is debilitation; if it be stilled, the
result is death.
(Footnotes omitted). See also A. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 34, at 25; BeVier, The First Amendment and Political Speech: An Inquiry Into the Substance and Limits ofPrinciple, 30 STAN. L.
Rev. 299, 358 (1978).
144. 27 Cal. 3d at 838, 614 P.2d at 753-54, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 96 (Richardson, J., dissenting).

